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Research on collective action confronts two major obstacles. First, inconsistency in the 
conceptualization and operationalization of collective action, the key factors expected to affect 
collective action, and the outcomes of collective action hampers the accumulation of knowledge. 
Inconsistent terminology obscures consistent patterns. Second, the scarcity of comparable data 
thwarts evaluation of the relative importance of the many variables identified in the literature as 
likely to influence collective action. The International Forestry Resources and Institutions (IFRI) 
research program addresses both of these problems. Since its founding in 1993, the IFRI network 
of collaborating research centers has used a common set of methods and concepts to study 
forests, the people who use forest resources, and their institutions for resource management. The 
basic social unit of analysis in IFRI is the user group, defined as a set of individuals with the 
same rights and responsibilities to forest resources. This definition does not require formal 
organization or collective action, since these features are potential dependent variables. This 
strategy for data collection allows analysis of relationships between diverse forms of social 
heterogeneity and collective action within groups with comparable rights to resources. IFRI￿s 
relational database also captures the connections among forest systems, sets of resource users, 
particular forest products, formal and informal rules for resource use, and formal local and supra-
local organizations. By the middle of 2001, the IFRI database included data on 141 sites with 
231 forests, 233 user groups, 94 forest organizations, and 486 products in 12 countries. Drawing 
upon these data, IFRI researchers are contributing substantially to our understanding of 
collective action for institutional development, the mediating role institutions play relative to 
demographic and market pressures in patterns of resource use, and relationships between 
particular institutions and forest conditions. The paper describes IFRI￿s strategy for collecting 
comparable data based on consistent conceptualization and operationalization, summarizes the 
contributions of IFRI research to the study of collective action for natural resource management, 
and identifies continuing challenges. 
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The scientific community has made considerable progress in understanding 
variation in collection action. Once the possibility for divergence between individual and 
social goods was recognized (Hardin 1968; Olson 1971 [1965]), many scholars and 
policy analysts saw prisoners￿ dilemmas and tragedies of the commons everywhere.  The 
supposed ubiquity of collective action problems justified nationalization or privatization 
of renewable natural resources around the world.
2 Yet, important differences exist among 
the types of collective action problems that individuals and communities confront.  It is 
important that we begin to identify conditions that facilitate or hinder collective action.  
Collective action is not problematic under all circumstances. Problems arise from 
inadequate information, conflicting interests, or the nature of the good itself. Game 
theorists have developed a variety of basic games to capture common aspects of social 
interaction. Several types of collective action problems exist that have relevance for 
natural resource management. When people lack information, coordination becomes 
difficult despite common goals (assurance games). Use and maintenance activities need 
to be coordinated to avoid crowding or achieve economies of scale. If multiple solutions 
exist to a collective action problem but have different distributional consequences, 
                                                 
1 The IFRI research program involves the study of forests, people, and institutions by a network of 
Collaborating Research Centers (CRCs) in 13 countries. The Workshop in Political Theory and Policy 
Analysis and the Center for the Study of Institutions, Population, and Environmental Change are jointly 
responsible for coordination of this program. Funding from the Ford Foundation, the MacArthur 
Foundation, and the FAO is gratefully acknowledged. 




competition over distributional issues can result in failures to cooperate (chicken games). 
The beneficiaries of alternative management strategies are often vastly different, for 
example, making agreement and cooperation difficult to achieve (battle of the sexes 
games). Rivalry in consumption and difficulty of exclusion make provision and 
sustenance of common-pool goods particularly challenging (social dilemma games ￿ 
more specifically, common-pool resource games).  Obstacles to exclusion encourage 
individuals to free-ride on the efforts of others. Difficulty of exclusion and rivalry of 
extraction characterize many natural resource systems, including forests, watersheds, and 
fisheries. These conditions can result in under-provision of management and degradation 
of common resources.  
Although collective action problems differ in severity, many case studies (Baland 
and Platteau 2000 [1996]; Bromley, et al. 1992; McCay and Acheson 1990; Ostrom 
1990) and evidence from laboratory experiments (Ostrom, Gardner and Walker 1994; 
Ostrom 2000; UdØhn 1993, 254 - 256) demonstrate that many varieties of collective 
action problems can be overcome. The on-going challenge is to better understand sources 
of variation in the success of collective action. A large number of factors have been 
identified as facilitating collective action, including characteristics of the collective 
problem,
3 characteristics of the group, institutional arrangements, technology, and the 
actions of national governments and other external actors (Ostrom, et al. 2002).
4  
Despite significant progress, many questions about prospects for collective action 
have yet to be solved. Lists of important variables differ (Agrawal 2001). Debates 
                                                 
3 For natural resource management, characteristics of the resource system greatly influence the nature of 
the collective problem. 
4 Agrawal (2001) summarizes factors identified as facilitating collective action for management of 




continue about whether and how particular factors, especially group size and 
heterogeneity, affect prospects for successful collective action (Agrawal and Goyal 2001; 
Baland and Platteau 1999; Bardhan and Dayton-Johnson 2002; Gibson and Koontz 1998; 
Johnson and Libecap 1982; Quiggin 1993; Ruttan and Borgerhoff Mulder 1999; 
Varughese and Ostrom 2001). And there is little consensus on the relative importance of 
explanatory factors or the nature and significance of interactions among them. The 
variety and number of factors associated with successful collective action, while 
encouraging for social relations, makes analysis difficult.  
Efforts to resolve puzzles about collective action through empirical research 
confront two major obstacles. First, the key factors expected to affect collective action 
and the outcomes of collective action are inconsistently conceptualized and measured.  
Inconsistent terminology and measurements may obscure consistent patterns or suggest 
patterns where none exist. Second, the scarcity of comparable data makes it impossible to 
evaluate the relative importance of many of the variables identified in the literature as 
likely to influence collective action.  Case studies are extremely important to an 
understanding that collective action is feasible, but case study authors tend to identify 
different variables to study and making the findings from case studies comparable is 
extremely difficult. 
Contributions of empirical research to the study of collective action will be 
limited unless the challenges of conceptual consistency and comparable data can be 
overcome. This paper describes an ambitious effort to meet these dual challenges: the 
International Forestry Resources and Institutions (IFRI) research program. To accumulate 




research centers was created, consisting of scholars committed to using the IFRI 
protocols in data collection and contributing their data to a common database. To achieve 
consistency of concepts and empirical measurement, IFRI researchers developed a 
common set of data collection instruments and common methods of data collection. 
The remainder of the paper is organized in five parts. First, we provide an 
overview of the IFRI research program. The second section concerns the need for 
comparable data and how the IFRI research strategy helps meet that need by building a 
sizeable database of comparable cross-national data more quickly than would have been 
possible for any single researcher or research center. We discuss the challenges of 
conceptual consistency and empirical measurement, and how researchers have used IFRI 
protocols to study collective action and various factors expected to influence success, in 
the third section. Despite the progress made, IFRI continues to struggle with conceptual 
consistency and the difficulty of analyzing complex processes. The fourth section 
identifies several such issues. Fifth, we summarize and conclude. 
 
2.  THE INTERNATIONAL FORESTRY RESOURCES AND INSTITUTIONS 
(IFRI) RESEARCH PROGRAM 
The IFRI research program engages an international network of scholars in long-
term, comparative research on forests, the people who use forest resources, and 
institutions for forest management (Ostrom 1998).
5 IFRI grew out of on-going efforts to 
study collective action for the management of common-pool resources. An initial 
database drew upon existing case studies ￿ mostly about fisheries, groundwater basins, 
and irrigation systems - and provided the basis for Governing the Commons (Ostrom 
                                                 




1990). It was followed by the Nepal Institutions and Irrigation Systems (NIIS) database. 
NIIS began by coding existing case studies, but also used relatively rapid field visits to 
fill in data points addressed ambiguously or not at all in the original study. An inquiry 
from the FAO￿s Forest, Trees, and People Program about the possibility of developing a 
similar database for forest resources prompted creation of the International Forestry 
Resources and Institutions (IFRI) research program. IFRI built upon the theoretical 
framework, empirical findings, and database structure of its two predecessors. IFRI 
differs considerably from these earlier efforts in its primary reliance on fieldwork rather 
than existing studies, the shift in attention to more complex and multiple product forest 
resource systems, and in organization as a research network.  
The international research network includes Collaborating Research Centers 
(CRCs) in Africa, Asia, Latin America, and North America.
6 IFRI studies encompass a 
wide array of forests and institutions. With studies in temperate forests in the U.S., the 
mountain forests of the Himalayas, and tropical moist and tropical dry forests in Africa, 
Asia, and Latin America, the research program encompasses diverse ecological 
conditions. IFRI forests range from a one-hectare cultural or sacred forest in Uganda to a 
Bolivian forest reserve of just under 45,000 hectares. Many IFRI forests are owned and 
managed by a national government, reflecting the prevalence of state control of natural 
resources in recent times. Other IFRI forests fall under private or communal ownership. 
These categories mask further diversity in property arrangements. Communal 
management, for example, occurs when governments grant villagers formal control, but 
also when local residents exercise de facto control in the absence of formal rights. A 
                                                 
6As of March 2003, there are 13 IFRI CRCs in 12 countries (see http://www.indiana.edu/~ifri/crcs.htm). 
The first were established in 1993. Revisits have begun in Kenya, Nepal, Uganda, and the USA (see Becker 




number of IFRI forests, owned as private property by groups of unrelated individuals, do 
not fit common understandings of private or communal property. A variety of 
management regimes exist in these forests, ranging from management for timber 
production, protection for wildlife or biodiversity conservation, to management for 
multiple uses.  
Data collection for the IFRI research program encompasses biophysical measures 
of forest conditions, climatic and soil conditions, demographic and economic indicators 
about the population of forest users, as well as details about institutions affecting use of 
forest resources. IFRI researchers conduct repeat studies of forest sites every three to five 
years. The interdisciplinary approach allows assessments of hypothesized relationships 
among biological, demographic, economic, and institutional variables. Analysis of social 
and institutional processes that take years to unfold becomes possible with the 
accumulation of time-series data. 
IFRI brings to the empirical study of collective action an international database of 
comparable studies from all over the world, with comparability ensured by the use of a 
common research framework and methodology. 
 
3.  IFRI AND THE CHALLENGE OF COMPARABLE DATA 
In a recent review of research on common-pool resources, Agrawal (2001) 
identified 33 separate explanatory factors that have been repeatedly identified in the 
literature as important. Given the large body of literature confirming the potential 
influence of each variable, he contends that analysis that excludes any of these factors 




number of variables, however, in most statistical analyses is not feasible, barring the use 
of Boolean algebra (Ragin 1987) or very large data sets subject to multivariate analysis. 
Multivariate analysis can incorporate numerous variables, but a much larger number of 
data points are required to reliably assess relationships. 
The empirical complexity of many variables of interest implies that substantial 
investments in fieldwork are required to obtain reliable data; as a result, scholars have 
been hard-pressed to build large databases for the study of common-pool resources. 
Large databases can be built by coding existing studies, as demonstrated by Tang (1992) 
and Schlager (1994). Since existing empirical studies typically address only a subset of 
the factors identified in the literature, missing data inevitably limits analysis. This sort of 
analysis also confronts differences in conceptualization and the empirical measurement of 
variables by different authors. Some researchers have collected data on relatively large 
sets of cases (Bardhan 2000; Dayton-Johnson 2000; Lam 1998; Jodha 1990; Shivakoti 
and Ostrom 2002). Ultimately, since there are limits to the time and financing available 
for data collection, a trade-off exists between the number and type of variables measured 
and the number of cases for which data can be collected. Careful sampling can control for 
some set of factors and limit the degree of bias likely in results. Nonetheless, it may not 
be possible to control for all variables excluded from data collection and analysis. And 
controlling for variables leaves many interesting questions un-addressed. 
Organization as a network of research centers facilitates comparative research. 
Members of the IFRI research network collect data on a common set of variables,
7 use 
the same methods for data collection, and share data in a growing international database, 
                                                 
7 IFRI represents the core, not the limits, of data collection. Many IFRI research teams collect supplemental 




thereby maintaining the comparability required for cross-national analysis. By early 
2002, data for 173 sites with 264 forests, 302 forest user groups, and 614 forest products 
had been entered into IFRI￿s common database.
8 The relative breadth of variables 
included in the IFRI protocols and relatively large number of data points in the database 
enables more complex multivariate analysis than would otherwise be possible. 
 
4.  THE CHALLENGE OF CONCEPTUAL AND EMPIRICAL CONSISTENCY 
If empirical research is to contribute to further progress in understanding 
conditions favorable for collective action, greater clarity will need to be achieved in the 
conceptualization of the unit of analysis, conceptualization of dependent and independent 
variables, and in how these concepts are operationalized for data collection and analysis. 
COLLECTIVE ACTION BY WHOM? 
For most discussions of collective action, ￿the group￿ is the unit of analysis. For 
research concerning natural resources, this means ￿the group that uses the resource￿ or 
￿the user group.￿ In theoretical work and empirical studies, the group is often a point of 
departure rather than subject of inquiry.
9 Yet, in actual data collection, people do not 
present themselves to researchers in unambiguously demarcated groups. Rather, 
empirical researchers have to determine how to conceptualize - and recognize in the field 
- the relevant set of people for analyzing the problem of collective action.  
In the abstract, it is simple enough to say that the relevant group includes 
individuals who face a collective action problem ￿ which is to say, who share some 
                                                 
8 Updates of the common database occur periodically, as new data comes in from collaborating research 
centers.  





interests in common. In practice, people have a number of interests, even within a single 
sphere of activity such as natural resource management. Membership in the set of 
individuals with the potential for collective action depends upon the problem under 
consideration. Subsets of individuals with an interest in sustaining a resource system may 
organize to pursue particularistic interests while the more encompassing set of 
individuals fail to act collectively.  
The implications of collective action at one level of aggregation for collective 
action at other levels of collective interest are not uniform. Consider two examples. 
Individuals who collect medicinal herbs may organize while those who collect firewood 
do not. If the herb collectors see the lack of collective action among firewood collectors 
as a problem for themselves, they may attempt to mobilize collective action at a level that 
encompasses both groups. If, however, timber harvesters have organized while those 
using a variety of non-timber forest products (NTFPs) have not, the incentive for timber 
harvesters to facilitate collective action among all users of forest resources is less 
apparent. Not all empirical studies about collective action for resource management 
explicitly address the possibility of multiple levels of collective action. Programs for 
community-based resource management often assume the presence of a clear community 
of interest at the level of the resource system.
10 
The IFRI research program uses a modular approach to evaluate the existence and 
consequences of collective action for forest management. The basic social unit of 
analysis is the user group, defined as a set of individuals with the same rights and 
responsibilities to forest resources. This definition does not require formal organization or 
                                                 
10 See Campbell et al. (2001) and Turner (1999) for critiques of community-based programs for resource 
management. See Agrawal and Gibson (1999; 2001) for a more general critique of the use of the term 




collective action. Groups that have organized institutions for collective decision-making 
are considered forest associations. Forest associations may bring together more than one 
user group, although many of studies find a one to one relationship between user groups 
and forest associations. Recognition that groups with common rights and responsibilities 
may or may not be involved in collective action or have institutionalized rules for 
collective decision-making makes it possible to analyze this variation. This strategy for 
data collection allows analysis of collective action and its absence within groups with 
comparable rights to resources.  
In many forests, IFRI methods identify multiple user groups. Because user groups 
are defined according to their rights and responsibilities to the forest, the number of user 
groups says little by itself about the degree of specialization in use of forest products. 
Two user groups may use different sets of forest products, although overlaps in the 
products used are common. If a forest association exists in an IFRI site, it may represent 
one or more user group. Forest associations may encompass a large proportion of forest 
users, or they may be formed by a subset of forest users. The presence or absence of a 
forest association is an indication of collective action for the creation of institutions to 
manage forest resources. By itself, the existence of a forest association does not reveal 
what proportion of forest users is acting collectively in this manner. The IFRI database 
includes information about the scope of representation by forest associations, but a 
researcher would have to dig around a bit to access this data and get it into a form 
amenable to analysis.  
IFRI￿s distinction between user groups and forest associations greatly facilitates 




and measuring potential collective action.  It also ensures the collection of data about 
groups that have overcome collective action problems as well as those that have not. 
Since groups may act collectively for some but not all aspects of forest management, this 
modular approach to collective action also facilitates analysis that distinguishes among 
types of collective action (see below). IFRI￿s use of commonality in rights and 
responsibility relative to a forest as the defining characteristic of a user group is less 
helpful for research concerned with the scope of collective action or about the 
￿community￿ as the social unit of analysis. 
IS THIS GROUP ACTING COLLECTIVELY? 
The difficulty of recognizing informal institutions and discerning the 
effectiveness of formal institutions on forest conditions represents an important challenge 
for institutional analysis. Biophysical data on forest conditions can be used to discern the 
effectiveness of collective action for forest management. If forest users have developed 
rules of forest management, whether formal or informal, and those rules effectively alter 
behavior (i.e., they are ￿rules-in-use￿), changes will occur in the patterns of forest use. 
IFRI￿s research strategy involves the collection of descriptions of rules and evaluations of 
their effectiveness through interviews and participatory sessions, plus the collection of 
data on forest conditions. With both social and biophysical data, it becomes possible to 
check social scientific data about rules for management against biophysical data on forest 
conditions.  
In general, harvesters of forest products are expected to engage in optimal 
foraging strategies unless rules-in-use constrain their behavior. Optimal foraging implies 




use forest products that are the most valuable (in terms of yield minus cost of extraction). 
When the value of forest products does not vary with location, then optimal foraging 
implies that the most accessible resources will be harvested first. All else equal, 
proximity to settlements and to roads lowers the cost of extraction. Steep slopes, 
impassible rivers, and other physical impediments increase the difficulty of extraction, 
and are usually utilized after more geographically accessible areas. In the absence of 
institutions that alter patterns of forest use, the biophysical data should reveal evidence of 
extraction that reflects proximity and physical accessibility. Smaller, younger trees 
should be found closer to settlements and roads, and in flatter areas, with larger, older 
trees deeper in the forest and on steeper slopes. If effective institutions for forest 
management are in place, however, the institutions alter the cost-benefit calculus. 
Depending on the nature of the management rules, patterns of harvesting should change 
in ways that will be measured biophysical data from forest plots. Four recent IFRI studies 
(Schweik 2000; Banana, Gombya-Ssembajjwe, and Bahati 2001; Becker and Leon 2000; 
Gibson 2001) compare actual forest conditions with predictions based on optimal 
foraging theory to evaluate the influence of institutions upon forest conditions.  
In Nepal, partial enforcement of national rules for forest conservation had the 
unintended consequence of shifting extraction from areas near the villages and roads to a 
more ecologically vulnerable watershed (Schweik 2000). Officials charged with 
enforcing national policy and the villagers faced the same physical terrain. Because the 
officials could more readily monitor forest use in areas near the roads, near settlements, 
and on lower slopes, villagers could count on tighter enforcement in these areas. Data 




slopes further from their settlements. These physically less accessible areas represent a 
more ecologically vulnerable portion of the forest. Both the forest and the villagers would 
be better off in the absence of national forest rules than with their current haphazard 
enforcement.  
Likewise, the limited capacity of the Ugandan forest department results in 
reasonably tight enforcement of a ban on timber harvesting near the capital city, but in 
consistently high levels of illegal harvesting further away (Banana, Gombya-Ssembajjwe 
and Bahati 2001). In the absence of rules affecting timber harvesting, one would expect 
heavier levels of extraction closer to Kampala, because the higher concentration of 
people in the capital city represents a large market. In the absence of spatial variation in 
the level of enforcement, the ban should decrease timber harvesting throughout Mpigi 
district, in which Kampala lies. One would still expect higher levels of illegal harvesting 
in the vicinity of the capital. The presence of greater evidence of timber harvesting 
further away from the capital city strongly supports a general sense that levels of 
enforcement decrease with distance from Kampala.  
In Bolivia, deviations from use patterns associated with optimal foraging among 
the YuracarØ challenged assumptions that such indigenous peoples lack systems for forest 
management (Becker and LØon 2000). In the early 1990s, the Bolivian government 
adopted a policy that allows indigenous people to gain formal title to their territories, but 
requires that they first develop a formal management plan for the forest resources. The 
policy suggests the absence of indigenous systems for forest management. Data from 
forests managed by the YuracarØ revealed that they do have an effective system for 




Building upon the existing system makes more sense in this situation than developing a 
management plan from scratch, as called for by government policy.  
In contrast, evidence that extraction closely matched patterns associated with 
optimal foraging bolstered Gibson￿s claim that two villages in Guatemala lacked 
institutions for forest management (2001). Villagers might not report rules about forest 
management because they were suspicious of outsiders, or the researchers might fail to 
recognize informal rules, but the biophysical evidence eases such doubts about the lack of 
social scientific evidence of rules. Where biophysical evidence of optimal foraging 
confirms that communities truly lack rules for forest management, external intervention 
could raise awareness of indirect benefits associated with forest conservation and 
encourage the development of rules for forest management. After an IFRI study in Loma 
Alta, Ecuador revealed the absence of local institutions for forest management and a lack 
of appreciation for the forest￿s role in watershed protection, a series of participatory 
studies organized by a non-government organization demonstrated dramatic differences 
in fog interception associated with variable forest conditions (Becker 1999). The villagers 
subsequently decided to protect a portion of their forest for watershed management. 
COLLECTIVE ACTION FOR WHAT? 
Collective action can take many forms, including the development of institutions 
(e.g., rules for resource management), resource mobilization (e.g., to hire guards or invest 
in maintenance activities), coordination of activities (e.g., to avoid crowding), and 
information sharing (e.g., about techniques or the location of mobile resources). Scholars 
generally state clearly the nature of collective action under consideration in any particular 




the study of collective action. Efforts to synthesize findings from multiple studies face the 
challenge of evaluating the analytically relevant similarities and differences among 
different types of collective action. Even within any category of collective action, such as 
institutional design or resource mobilization, the difficulty of acting collectively can vary 
dramatically. 
IFRI scholars study various forms of collective action. The studies discussed in 
the section on optimal foraging were concerned with institutional development in the 
form of management rules. These scholars were less concerned with the formalization of 
management rules in a forest association. Other IFRI scholars concerned with collective 
action for resource management have developed indices that measure aspects of 
collective action in forest management. Indices developed by both Varughese (1999) and 
Chakrabarti et al. (2001) recognize the importance of distinguishing between the creation 
of collective rules and action to implement and enforce collective rules. 
Varughese (1999), in a study of 18 sites in Nepal￿s middle hills, developed an 
index including the presence of collective rules constraining access to and harvest from 
forests, organization of group activities related to forest management, and monitoring 
activities by group members as evidence of collective activity. The presence of group 
activities and rules for management indicate a moderate level of collective activity; high 
scores on this index require monitoring of rules for forest access and use. This study 
found that forest conditions were more closely correlated with levels of collective action 
than with population pressure. 
For analysis of 12 sites in North Bengal, India, Chakrabarti et al. (2001) 




(e.g., planting seedlings, harvesting, marketing of forest products). For this index, a group 
earns 0.5 points for each management activity for which it has adopted a rule; actual 
coordination on implementation of collective rules earns 1.0 point per activity. This 
analysis also found a positive correlation between forest conditions and levels of 
collective action. Higher levels of collective action were more common in communities 
with prior experience with self-governance through Panchayati Raj institutions, and in 
communities with greater heterogeneity in wealth and education. 
Another set of studies focuses on collective action for the mobilization of 
resources required for effective monitoring and enforcement of rules for forest 
management. Monitoring and enforcement is costly. In some communities, responsibility 
for guarding rotates among households. Other communities raise funds to hire individuals 
to guard forest resources on behalf of the community. For the community to hire guards, 
it must mobilize resources for this collective goal (Agrawal 2000; Agrawal and Goyal 
2001). Hiring a guard is a lumpy good; the guard must be retained for a minimal number 
of months to effectively protect forest resources. A series of articles about forest councils 
in Kumaon, India measures collective action in terms of resource mobilization as the 
monetary value of the contribution per household, the group budget for protection, or the 
number of months each community was able to pay the guard (Agrawal 2000; Agrawal 
and Goyal 2001). These studies revealed a curvilinear relationship between group size 
and collective action for resource mobilization: the smallest groups had less success than 
somewhat larger groups in mobilizing the resources requiring for forest protection. 
The IFRI research network has not limited its attention to any single form of 




with overlapping but not identical research questions. Diversity of approaches has merit; 
comparisons of alternative conceptualizations of hypothesized relationship can help 
advance knowledge more rapidly. The lack of consistency in measurement of collective 
action does raise the risk of miscommunication between scholars who use the same terms 
to describe somewhat different phenomena. Clear explanations of variables and how they 
have been measured offer the best defense against miscommunication.  
 WHAT AFFECTS COLLECTIVE ACTION? 
The conceptual and empirical challenges related to independent variables that 
may affect the likelihood of collective action are even more extreme. When scholars 
debate the importance of group size, for instance, it is not clear that a common frame of 
reference exists. Is a group of 100 individuals large or small? What about a group of 1000 
individuals, or of 50? Likewise, scholars concerned about the implications of 
heterogeneity for collective active discuss a number of different forms of group diversity 
(Varughese and Ostrom 2001; Keohane and Ostrom 1995). Many studies on 
heterogeneity focus on economic inequality, but even economic inequality may refer to 
either income or assets (Baland and Platteau 1999; Quiggin 1993; Ruttan and Borgerhoff 
Mulder 1999). Others have examined heterogeneity in values (Gibson and Koontz 1998), 
of knowledge and skills (Johnson and Libecap 1982), of location (Ostrom 1996; 
Varughese 1999; Varughese and Ostrom 2001), or of interest in maintaining the resource. 
It is not at all obvious how one should compare findings from studies that use the same 
terms for either very different concepts ￿ as with heterogeneity ￿ or for varying 




Even when the concept is clearly agreed upon, differences may arise from 
operationalization in data collection and analysis. Some concepts are unavoidably 
subjective. What is an adequate level of monitoring? How much disagreement is 
consistent with a common understanding? How can the level of trust in a community be 
determined objectively? In the case of trust and many other variables, measurement is 
both subjective and indirect. Some conceptual variables have many components 
empirically. Wealth, for example, may take the form of livestock, capital assets such as 
houses and tools, and cash. The same concepts may be used to refer to data that reflects 
different aspects of the same phenomenon. The problem grows all the more complicated 
when empirical manifestations of a concept, like wealth, are contextual. 
The distinction drawn in data collection between user groups and forest 
associations is characteristic of IFRI￿s modular approach to data collection. Participants 
in the design of the IFRI research instruments knew they needed measures for several 
factors suspected to influence collective action. These included population pressure, 
group size, market pressure, local autonomy, heterogeneity, economic and subsistence 
significance of the forest, difficulty of exclusion, and difficulty of understanding how 
forest resources respond to human actions. For each of these concepts, multiple empirical 
indicators existed. IFRI data collection protocols were designed to capture multiple 
indicators of potential concepts of interests, and to do so in a way that allows a number of 
different combinations.  
The lack of consistency in concepts and their empirical measurement represents a 
major challenge for the accumulation of knowledge about the factors affecting collective 




actually contradict; apparently similar findings may actually refer to different issues. 
Synthesis of findings becomes very difficult under these conditions. Without a valid 
understanding of what is reliably known from past studies, the design of new empirical 
studies to advance knowledge further becomes quite difficult. 
 
5.  CONTINUING CHALLENGES 
The International Forestry Resources and Institutions research strategy addresses 
two major challenges to empirical research on collective action. The use of common 
research instruments and techniques for data collection provide a foundation of 
conceptual consistency. Organization as a network of research centers results in more 
rapid accumulation of comparable, cross-national data. Further, data are collected by 
researchers who are closely familiar with local languages, customs, and ways of 
organizing.  Graduate students associated with IFRI centers inherit a rich source of data 
for further analysis and contribute to the store for those who follow.  It is possible to 
return to a site at relatively low cost to check out missing data or do a complete follow-up 
visit.  
The IFRI strategy has not eliminated all challenges, nor is it possible to do so. 
IFRI struggles with the need to balance consistency of concepts and methods throughout 
the network with the desirability of conceptual and methodological evolution in response 
to the accumulation of knowledge.  The concept of the user group and the problem of 
identifying group boundaries have particular importance for the study of collective 




management. In addition, IFRI is still working toward realization of the full benefits of 
organization as a network.  
The reliability of IFRI￿s common database relies upon consistency of concepts 
and methods across research teams. That consistency is reinforced through an annual 
nine-week training program at Indiana University plus less frequent regional training 
programs. But insistence on conceptual and methodological consistency runs counter to 
the evolutionary nature of learning. Knowledge advances through the refinement of 
concepts and methods in response to findings from past studies. IFRI researchers 
recognize the need to balance consistency with revision following learning, and are 
grappling with ways to do so. Biennial meetings of the full network offer opportunities to 
discuss modifications to the research program. Attitudes toward change have been 
conservative. Although conservatism limits the ability to incorporate new knowledge 
guards, it also against the loss of comparability across studies conducted at different 
times. 
IFRI has always allowed researchers to supplement the common core of data 
collection. By supplementing the core data collection instruments, research teams can try 
out alternative measurements and methods without endangering comparability on the 
common variables. Efforts are currently underway to increase communication across the 
network about various efforts to develop new or alternative measurements.  
Supplementary measures of interest throughout the network could become candidates for 
incorporation into the core instruments, perhaps as substitutes for current measures that 




Despite the accumulation of IFRI data, only a few IFRI studies have attempted to 
use data from multiple countries (Poteete 2001; Gibson, Williams, and Ostrom 1999).   
Many IFRI publications concern either a single case or a paired comparison (Gibson 
McKean and Ostrom 2000). IFRI colleagues who have completed a larger number of 
sites have begun to do multivariate analyses, but usually limit themselves to data from 
their own sites (Agrawal and Yadama 1997; Agrawal and Goyal 2001; Banana, Gombya-
Ssembajjwe and Bahati 2001; Varughese and Ostrom 2001; Varughese 1999). The 
scarcity of cross-national analysis reflects the difficulty of drawing comparisons across 
ecological zones, cultures, and political boundaries. Ecological measures of forest 
condition, such as height or diameter at breast height or species diversity, are strongly 
affected by a variety of localized ecological conditions and topography. Measurements of 
healthy forests in the Himalayas, in the moist tropics of Guatemala, and arid tropical 
areas of Mexico or Uganda will differ considerably on many of these forest mensurations.   
Comparative analysis that includes forest condition as the dependent variable or 
as an important independent variable depends upon techniques or proxy measurements 
that allow comparisons across ecological zones. Even for analyses that do not include 
biophysical data, differences in culture and policy environment across countries may 
affect outcomes. Indeed, inclusion of dummy variables for Uganda, the USA, and Nepal 
revealed noteworthy country-specific effects on efforts by user groups to exclude others 
from forest resources (Poteete 2001). Limitations to comparability do not make cross-
national analysis impossible, but do make it more difficult. The analytical difficulty of 




arguments in favor of a strategy of testing hypotheses first with data from a single 
country, and then scaling up to cross-national analysis. 
The potential of the IFRI network does not depend solely upon an increase in 
cross-national analysis. Communication about findings within the network enhances their 
incorporation into the design of future studies. Regular communication about research 
activities depends upon declining telecommunication costs, especially for internet access, 
and more frequent opportunities for face-to-face exchange. Regular synthesis of findings 
identifies emerging themes, disseminate findings to a larger audience, and influence 
future studies. 
6.  CONCLUSIONS 
It is difficult to write a ￿concluding section￿ when one is describing the efforts of 
an on-going research program to solve extremely challenging puzzles that underlie all 
efforts to build systematic knowledge about collective action.   Users of forestry 
resources are interacting with complexly, adapting ecological systems and are themselves 
a part of a human, complex, adaptive systems.  Both ecological and human systems exist 
at multiple scales over time.  Consequently, the challenge for all researchers and policy 
analysts is to gain a slow accumulation of knowledge about the processes within these 
complex systems and how they adapt to change over time.   
The International Forestry Resources and Institutions research program is an 
effort to use a consistent set of concepts and ways of measuring these concepts in order to 
facilitate the long-term understanding of collective action processes as related to forests.   
The effort has already produced a better understanding of how the heterogeneity of users 




by rules designed to provide different roles, duties, and benefits to different groups of 
users (Varughese 1999). We have learned that whether individuals are motivated to think 
about engaging in collective action is strongly affected by their perceptions of the 
condition of a resource ￿ not by the ￿actual￿ condition (Agrawal 2000; Gibson, Lehoucq, 
and Williams 2002; Gibson and Becker 2000; Tucker 1999). Those perceptions can in 
turn be changed by a variety of techniques that give more accurate feedback to users 
about the functioning of the relevant ecosystem and its condition (Becker 1999). We have 
learned that distance between a forest and a large urban area has several impacts on forest 
conditions including the capacity to monitor harvesting rates as well as the cost of 
transporting forest products (Banana, Gombya-Ssembajjwe and Bahati 2001). And, we 
have learned many other interesting relationships that we and other scholars will continue 
to explore in the coming years as we all try to gain clearer conceptions of key variables 
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